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EMPLOYER UTTERANCES AS UNFAIR
EMPLOYER UTTERANCES AS UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
T HE Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, popularly styled
the Taft-Hartley Law, is the most comprehensive and detailed
single piece of labor legislation enacted in this country. As illus-
trative of its scope, the statute extends the legislative mandate into
the field of civil liberties, inasmuch as a provision thereof, Section
8 (c),2 undertakes to protect the employer in the exercise of his
right to speak and write about matters germane to a labor dispute.
The fact that Congress is apparently attempting to redefine or
revitalize a Constitutional right gives rise to a number of interest-
ing problems. For example, why was it necessary for Congress to
provide legislative protection to the right of an employer to speak
and write freely when this right is made inviolate by the fun-
damental law of the land, our Constitution? Apparently the exer-
cise of this right had been measurably restricted, at least to a
degree considered by the legislators as undesirable. Assuming the
restriction, under what theory of law was it justified, and what
were its boundaries?
Section 8 (c), the section under examination here, had no
counterpart in the National Labor Relations Act. The exact word-
ing of the section is as follows:
"The expressing of any views, argument or opinion, or the dis-
semination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual
form, shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice
under any of the provisions of this Act, if such expression contains no
threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit." s
The precise effect of this section upon existing law can best be
discovered by initial reference to (1) the measure of protection
129 U. S. C. A. § 141 et seq. (Supp. 1947).
2 Id. § 158 (c).
8 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. J 151 et seq. (1942).
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afforded all persons by the Constitution in the exercise of their
right to free speech, (2) the further restrictions imposed upon a
particular class of persons, employers, when such persons, in-
dulging in anti-union utterances, were found to have violated the
provisions of the old National Labor Relations Act, hereafter re-
ferred to as the Wagner Act.
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH
The First Amendment to the Fedleral Constitution provides that
Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech.'
Similar guarantees against state action are found in the constitu-
tions of the several states.' This right is also secured against
abridgement by the states by that provision of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Federal Constitution which prohibits a state
from depriving a person of liberty without due process of law.'
The right to discuss peaceably matters of public interest was con-
sidered to be of paramount importance by the framers of the
Constitution." Optimistically enough, the authors of the First
Amendment were of the opinion that freedom of discussion would
serve to instill in all persons "liberal sentiments on the administra-
tion of government ...whereby oppressive officers are ashamed
and intimidated into more honorable and just modes of conducting
affairs."8
The judicial development of the various doctrines designed to
preserve the right to exercise free speech has been influenced to a
considerable extent by the social and political objectives currently
considered by the judiciary to be of overriding importance. For
example, seditious speech, especially in time of war, falls beyond
the protection of the Constitution." As Mr. Justice Holmes said:
4 U. S. CONST. Art. I, § 8.
5 See TEXAS CONST. Art. I, § 8.
8 U. S. CONST. Amend XIV.
' I JOURNAL OF THE CONTINENTAL CONCRESS, 104 (1904 ed.).
8 Ibid.
9 Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47 (1919).
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"The character of every act depends upon the circumstances in
which it is done. The most stringent protection of free speech would
not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing
panic. It does not even protect a man from an injunction against
words having all the effect of force."' 10
When applied by courts, this doctrine was termed the "clear
and present danger" test, indicating that the right to speak or write
freely must yield if such acts will result in a clear and present
danger of bringing forth evils that the United States may constitu-
tionally seek to prevent. Freedom of speech was made subordinate
to the right of the nation and state to preserve themselves. The
doctrine has been applied in recent cases," retaining sufficient
flexibility to be capable of application to modem conditions of
state. In the recent case of United Public Workers v. Mitchell,1"
however, the Court chose to depart from the clear and present
danger test, at least to the extent of sustaining a restraint of free
speech if a statute having this effect was one reasonably deemed
by Congress to be necessary to the efficiency of public service. If
the latter test, the "reasonable legislation" test, continues in judi-
cial favor, it will not supplant the time-honored "clear and present
danger" test. Given the additional factor of danger to the efficiency
of public service, this test will merely serve to further restrict the
privilege.
From this brief analysis of constitutional principles, the follow-
ing propositions are ascertainable:
(a) Freedom of speech is not an absolute right, but is subject
to regulation and restriction for the public welfare.
(b) The enjoyment of the right of free speech may be re-
10 Id. at 52.
11 Craig v. Harney, 67 S. Ct. 1249 (1947) Thomas v. Collins, 326 U. S. 516 (1945)
West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624 (1943) ; Cantwell v. Con.
necticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940).
' 67 S. Ct. 556 (1947). The court there held that section 61(h) of the Hatch Act
was constitutional. The section concerned is partially quoted: "no officer or employee in
the executive branch of the Federal Government, or any agency or department thereof.
shall take any active part in political management or in political campaigns." 18 U. S.
C. A. § 61 et. seq. (Supp. 1947).
1948]
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stricted if the speech itself is clearly injurious to the nation or
state, or if the person claiming the privilege intended to bring
about those substantive evils which the nation or state has the
constitutional right to prevent.
(c) In determining if the speech, as a verbal act, is injurious
to the state or nation, the act takes character from the surrounding
circumstances.
(d) If the intent of the actor is the determinative factor, such
intent may be deduced from the consequences reasonably to be
expected to follow from the acts in question.
LIMITATIONS ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH UNDER THE WAGNER ACT
The Wagner Act singled out existing industrial strife as a very
real impediment to the free flow of commerce." Its express pur-
pose and policy was to restore and promote an equality of bargain-
ing power between an employer and his employees whereby dis-
turbances and interruptions to interstate commerce, which experi-
ence had found to be the result of this inequality, would be mini-
mized." Thus formulated, the policy of the statute then justified
the Supreme Court in holding the entire statute constitutional
under the Commerce clause of the Constitution." The validity of
the statute having been established, the right of an employer to
speak or write about labor problems was brought under judicial
scrutiny by means of a simple reasoning process. If, as stated by
Mr. Justice Holmes in Schenck v. United States," words might
have all the effect of force, it was not unlikely that the words of an
employer would tend to bring about or perpetuate industrial strife,
a substantive evil which the nation had the constitutional right to
prevent. Concretely, these words could have the effect of inter.
fering with the right to organize and bargain collectively granted
his employees in Section 7.17 If so, the uttering of such words be-
Is 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. § 151 (1942).
14 Ibid.
15N. L R. B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1 (1937).
Is Scbenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47 (1919).
IT 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. § 157 (1942).
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came an unfair labor practice under Section 8,8 and were suscep-
tible to a cease and desist order by the National Labor Relations
Board."9 A Board order, directed to an employer, requiring him to
cease and desist from making such utterances, secured real force
and effectiveness by a provision of the statute authorizing the Board
to obtain an order from a United States Circuit Court of Appeals
directing the employer to comply with the Board's decision. 0 But
if the employer chose to raise his privilege of free speech, the
courts were confronted with the problem of reconciling the pro-
visions of the statute with the First Amendment of the Constitution.
In each case the facts were of paramount importance. The
statute provided that "the findings of the Board as to the facts, if
supported by evidence, shall be conclusive."'" This provision was
interpreted by the Supreme Court to require substantial evidence,
or "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion." 2 Applying this standard,-the
Circuit Court of Appeals, in most instances, permitted the Board's
findings of unfair labor practices to remain undisturbed. The
weighing of conflicting evidence was held to be within the exclusive
province of the Board. 2 In Union Drawn Steel Co. v. N.L.R.B.," the
court sustained, as being supported by substantial evidence, a find-
ing based on hearsay. The reluctance on the part of courts to re-
view certain phases of administrative procedure was justified by
Mr. Justice Brandeis, in a case involving an alleged confiscatory
rate order by an administrative body, in this manner:
"May it not tend to emasculate or demoralize the rate-making body
if ultimate responsibility is transferred to others? To the capacity of
s Id.§ 158.
19 Id. § 160(a).
201d. § 160(e).
21 Ibid.
22 Consolidated Edison Co. v. N. L. R. B., 305 U. S. 197, 229 (1938).
2 8 Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. N. L R. B., 321 U. S. 678, 681 (1943).
24 109 F. (2d) 587 (C. C. A. 3d 1940).
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men there is a limit. May it not impair the quality of the work of the
courts if this heavy task of reviewing questions of fact is assumed?" '25
Early decisions by the Board reveal a strong tendency to utilize
this fact-finding power to restore a balance of bargaining power
to the industrial disputants. The poicv of the statute, i.e., to
protect the employee in his efforts to organize and bargain col-
lectively, was the determining factor in close cases. If a shifting,
illusory fact pattern could sustain either a finding that an utterance
was privileged or that it constituted an unfair labor practice, the
latter view would prevail. For example, speeches made before a
union organization was perfected, or during the process of or-
ganization, were apt to be unfair labor practice."' At such a time,
the feeble organizational drive could easily be halted. Similarly,
the announcement of a Christmas bonus at a time when the em-
ployees were seeking to organize, was held to violate the provisions
of the statute."' A "fallacious" argument to an unlearned audience
was found to be capable of changing an otherwise innocuous state-
ment into an unfair labor practice. That is, economic arguments
by the employer to the effect that wages were determined by the
relation of selling prices to cost was forbidden by the Board as a
"counsel of futility." ' While an employer might emphasize the
fact that the employees could resign from a union if they chose,
he was under a duty to give equal emphasis to the positive rights
secured to the employees by the statute.: These few cases indicate
the early trend of the Board's decisions. However, since an order
of the Board was ineffective until the acquiescence and affirmative
approval of the appropriate court was secured, the doctrines an-
nounced by the courts are of greater importance.
From the initial judicial treatment of the problem, two distinct
concepts emerged. The first may be called the "economic de-
25 St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States. 298 U. S. 38,92 (1935).
26 In re Harrisburg Children's Dress Co., 2 N. L. R. B. 1058 (1937) ; in re Crawford
Mfg. Co.,8 N. L. R. B. 1227 (1938).
27 In re Roberti Bros., 8 N. L. R. B. 925 (1938).
28 In re Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 17 N. L. R. B. 666 (1939).
29In re Standout Hat Co.. 17 N. L. R. B. 883 (1939).
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pendence" theory which takes form in the general proposition
that since the employer dominates his employees in an economic
sense, any anti-union utterances were apt to be per se violative
of the Wagner Act. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned
that because of this relation-hip, anti-union utterances of the
employer would "have a force independent of persuasion."' ' The
Supreme Court itself took notice of the fact that "slight sugges-
tions as to the employer's choice between unions may have telling
effect among men who know the consequences of incurring the
employer's strong displeasure.-"' An analogous doctrine, perhaps
best called the "neutrality" ' c ": an to emerge i court
decisions, requiring the employer to maintain an attitude of strict
neutrality toward all union activities." "Interference," "re-
straint," and "coercion" were not given separate and distinct
meanings, but were legally synonymous.
The Supreme Court's decision in the Virginia Electric & Power
case, 3  handed down in 1941., announced the principles which
were to guide the courts and the Board in subsequent cases. The
court recognized that words in themselves may be coercive, but
if not of such a nature, they might gain this status when considered
a part of and in reference :o an entire compqlex of past acts and
words."' This doctrine, known as the "totality of conduct" doctrine,
N. L. R. B. v. Federbush C(,.. Inc.. 121 F. 12d 1 954. 957 1 C. C. A. 2d 1941) : over.
ruled in N. L. R. B. v. American Tube Bending Co., 134 F. (2d 1 993 cC. C. A. 2d 1941).
31 Int. Assn. of Machinists v. N. L. [t. B.. 311 U. S. 72. 78 -1940'.
" "The employer has no more right to intrude himself into the employee's efforts to
organize and select their repre'enatives to represent thewm in collective bargaining than
the employee would have to intrId himself into a st,,ck,'ldera meeting to interfere with
the election of the company's director, ... ." N. .. R1. B. v. W. A. Jones Foundry &
Machine Co., 123 F. t2d) 552, 555 IC. C. A. 7th 19.11'. See also N. L. R. B. v. Link-Belt
Co.. 311 U. S. 584, 600 119-15 1: "Intimations of an employer's preference, though subtle,
may be as potent as outright threats of discharge."
3.3 Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. N. L. R. B., 314 U. S. 469 (1941'.
34 "The mere fact that language merges into a course of conduct does not put that
whole course without tile range of otherwise applicable administrative power. In deter.
mining whether the Company actually interfered with, restrained, and coerced its
employees, the Board has a right to look at what the Company has said. as well as what
it has done." Id. at 478. The ease was sent back to the Board because the record did not
reveal sufficient evidence of this connection. Judge Learned Hand. in N. L. R. B. v.
American Tube Bending Co., 134 F. (2d) 993, 995 (C. C. A. 2d 1943) concluded that
194-8]
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is a re-expression of Mr. Justice Holmes' statement to the effect
that "the character of every act depends upon the circumstances
in which it is done." 5 Recent cases continued to apply the proposi-
tion that coercive words standing alone may violate the Wagner
Act."' The "totality of conduct" doctrine also became an accepted
judicial standard."
With a growing awareness of their responsibilities under the
Wagner Act, employer utterances which could be deemed unmis-
takably coercive by their terms became uncommon. The appeal-
able situations usually involved an application of the "totality of
conduct" doctrine, the question no longer being whether or not
the employer had a constitutional right to say what he pleased,
but the more troublesome question of whether or not the employee
was actually prevented from freely enjoying the rights guaranteed
him by the Act. Usually the solution involved the weighing of a
highly complex and shifting pattern of factors, unique to the case,
and thus unproductive of the solid precedent so revered by the
American judiciary. For example, in enforcing the statute, courts
were called upon to distinguish between "influence" and "inter-
ference;" utterances which intimated reprisals, and those which
did not. 9 To be called upon to assay and bring order to a multi-
tude of imponderables, legally lifeless without reference to an
economic postulate, was in itself, an invitation to the judiciary to
take note of the changes taking place in the economic order, to
halt the pro-labor pendulum, and to start it along its return arc.
In the last analysis, the criterion of coercion was the demonstrated
strength of the labor movement.
the employer had claimed the privilege of freedom of speech and that the Supreme Court
had sustained it. But see N. L R. B. v. M. E. Blatt Co., 143 F. (2d) 268, 274 (C. C. A. 3d
1944) for the contrary view.
35 Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47, 52 (1919).
36 N. L R. B. v. Winona Textile Mills, 19 LAB. REL RE. M". 2417, 2422. (C. C. A.
8th 1947).
37 N. L R. B. v. M. E. Blatt Co., 143 F. (2d) 268 (C. C. A. 3d 1944); Reliance Mfg.
Co. v. N. L R. B., 143 F. (2d) 761 (C. C. A. 7th 1944).
38 Midland Steel Product Co. v. N. L R. B., 113 F. (2d) 800 (C. C. A. 6th 1940).
39 N. L I. B. v. Trojan Powder Co., 135 F. (2d) 337 (C. C. A. 3d 1943).
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When a court attempts to mark out the degree to which the free
will of a particular class of persons has been influenced by the
words of an individual, it is in effect, attempting to project the
judicial imagination into the human mental process. Obviously
this is a delicate and baffling endeavor, ill-suited to practical
judicial methodology. Early in the period of enforcement of the
Wagner Act, a short cut was developed. A simple subjective test
of coercion was evolved whereby speech could be proscribed
without reference to its actual effect. The Third Circuit Court of
Appeals was of the opinion that the Wagner Act did "not require
proof that the proscribed conduct had its desired effect.""0 State-
ments were condemned without regard to their effect on the
minds of the employees if they "served to support" the Board's
conclusion,"1 or even if thev were merely "symptomatic" of an
existing attitude of anti-unionism." Under this view. utterances
might become unfair labor practices without reference to their
effectiveness, and moreover, could be used as "evidence" of the
unfairness of other activities. The latter approach involved a new
use of the doctrine of the Virginia Electric Co. case." There tle
utterances were held susceptible to a coercive finding if past events
imparted this quality; under this theory, separate events, as unfair
labor practices under other provisions of [he \Vagner \ 't. may
derive a flavor of illegality from the utterances.'
The subjective test of coercion, outlined above, was by no means
universally accepted. A number of courts insisted upon anl olc-
tive test, requiring proof that the utterances complained of had
40 N. L. R. B. v. John Engeihorn & Sons, 113 F. (2d) 553 t C. C. A. 3d 194: I.
41 Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. N. L. R. B.. 113 F. t2d) 85 tC. C. A. 5th 0,1,0).
See also American National Bank of St. Paul v. N. L. R. B., 144 F. (2d) 268 (C. C. A.
8th 19-14).
4" Boeing Airplane Co. v. N. L. R. B., 140 F. (2d) 203 (C. C. A. 10th 1944P.
43 314 U. S. 469 (1941).
44 See N. L. R. B. v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 147 F. (2d) 262 (C. C. A. 6th 1945).
The court was of the view that while an employer's expression of views might not be an
unfair labor practice in itself, the views are important in determining whether the
employees have reasonable grounds to believe that supervisors, in discouraging tinioni.
zation, represented the views of management.
19481
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the unmistakable effect of depriving the employee of his rights
under the Wagner Act. The words used by the Supreme Court in
elevating the right to picket to a constitutional status in Thornhill
v. Alabama,45 took on a fresh meaning in view of the growing
might of the labor unions. There the Court had said:
"Free discussion concerning the conditions in industry, and the
causes of labor disputes appears to us indispensable to the effective
and intelligent use of the process of popular government to shape
the destinies of modern society."' 6
That same year, a court had occasion to utter a warning that
"unless the right of free speech is enjoyed by employers as well
as by the employees, the guarantee of the First Amendment is
futile,'" 7 and to recall that freedom of speech "is the matrix, the
indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom.""
But the subjective test rested on foundations more firm than a
vagrant judicial conscience. In the Ford Motor Co. case,4 1 the court
listed the following factors as having an important bearing on
its decision to protect the utterances under attack: (a) The
passage of the Wagner Act itself, (b) its adjudication of constitu-
tionality, (c) the liberal attitude of the courts in construing it,
(d) the enjoyment by employees of freedom from fear of em-
ployer reprisals. An important question to be answered was
whether or not the utterances in question did actually bring about
the alleged results.50 So much is implied in a decision holding a
Is Thornhill v. State of Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 (1940).
461d. at 103.
47 Midland Steel Products Co. v. N. L R. B., 113 F. (2d) 800,804 (C. C. A. 6th 1940,.
48N. L R. B. v. Ford Motor Co., 114 F. (2d) 905,914 (C. C. A. 6th 1940). The quoted
words are from the opinion of Mr. Justice Cardozo in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319,
327 (1937).
49 N. L R. B. v. Ford Motor Co., Id. at 914. Other courts have refused to follow the
Ford case because there the order of the Board sought to enjoin all future anti-union
utterances, whereas the Board has power to seek the aid of the courts in restraining only
adjudicated unfair labor practices. The anti-union statement by the Ford Motor Company
might not, at some future date, have a coercive effect. See N. L R. B. v. New Era Die Co.
Inc., 118 F. (2d) 500 (C. C. A. 3d 1941); N. L R. B. v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 118
F. (2d) 874 (C. C. A. 1st 1941).
50 Press Co., Inc. v. N. L R. B.; Gannett Co., Inc. v. N. L R. B., 118 F. (2d) 937
(App. D. D. C. 1940) "Before oral statements of an employer may be held to be an unfair
[Vol. 2
EMPLOYER UTTERANCES AS UNFAIR
communication to be a mere "informative" letter," or an "appeal
to reason."" Expressions of hostility became "privileged opin.
ions" in the absence of a showing that employees were thereby
prevented from joining or prompted to quit the union." The occa-
sion on which the employee elected to utter his thoughts was not
deemed to be significant." The employer was not to be put at the
"mercy of the varied understanding of his hearers and conse-
quently of whatever inference may be drawn as to his intent and
meaning."" The employer was not required to stand "mute as a
sheep before his shearer" in face of attacks on his reputation."
The employee was no longer deemed to be unaware of his rights
under the Wagner Act, and therefore helpless, for employees,
equally with management, were presumed to have knowledge of
its provisions."
Enough has been cited to demonstrate a growing disinclination
on the part of the courts to maintain the fetters placed upon the
employer's right to free speech by early decisions. In turn, this
led to a change in the Board's treatment of the problem. By 1947
the subjective test of coercion was recognized in a number of the
Board's decisions."' I n light of the times, an employer utterance
could be said to concern ". . . matters on which the employees as
well as the company, were able to exercise reason and judg-
labor practice, it must appear that they interfered with, restrained, or coerced employees
in the rights guaranteed by the act ... "
5 Big Lake Oil Co. v. N. L. R. B., 146 F. (2d) 967 (C. C. A. Sib 1945).
52 N. L. R. B. v. West Kentucky Coal Co., 152 F. (2d) 193 (C. C. A. 6th 1945 .
53 Jacksonville Paper Co. v. N. L. R. B., 137 F. (2d) 148 (1943) ; N. L. R. B. v. J. L
Brandies & Sons, 145 F. (2d) 556 (C. C. A. 8th 1944).
4 N. L. R. B. v. American Tube Bending Co., 134 F. (2d) 993 (C. C. A. 2d 1943);
Continental Box Co. v. N. L R. B.. 113 F. (2d, 93 (C. C. A. 5th 1940) ; N. L. R. B. v.
West Kentucky Coal Co., 152 F. (2d) 198 (C. C. A. 6th 1945).
55 N. L. R. B. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 157 F. (2d) -4,86, 500 (C. C. A. 8th 1946).
56 Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. N. L. R. B., 113 F. (2d) 85, 89 (C. C. A. 5th 1940).
4- Midland Steel Products Co. v..N. L. R. B., 113 F. (2d) 800 (C. C. A. 6th 1940).
5 Federal.Mogul Corp., 73 N. L. R. B. No. 69 (1947) (statements of "genuine pol.
icy"); Fafner Bearing Co., 73 N. L. 1.. B. No. 189 (1947) (mere offers of advice);




ment." The "totality of conduct" doctrine was yet a useful tool,8 0
but significantly, its uses by the Board was predicated on a "well
defined" course of coercive conduct, that is, stronger evidence
was required." Moreover, the Board required a showing of posi-
tive coercive effect based upon reasonably contemporaneous
conduct. 2
By way of summary then, it can be said that the protection of
the employee's rights under the Wagner Act was effectuated by
use of legal theories as flexible as the needs of the case. The basic
premise remained inviolate: the courts were charged with the
duty of protecting his right to enter the ranks of the labor move-
ment and treat with the employer from that vantage point. All
courts, during the period of enforcement of the Wagner Act were in
agreement on this. But a stare decisis definition of what amounted
to a deprivation of the right was impracticable. The decisions of
the courts were conditioned by their estimates of existing employee
solidarity and the relative immunity from employer interference
at that time.
EFFECT OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT
Under the Wagner Act, the limitation placed upon the em-
ployer's right to free speech was the product of judicial decision.
By way of contrast, the Labor Management Act purports to deal
with this problem in a specific manner. But it is by no means
correct to assume that the specific statute will supersede all that
was the law before its advent, for the Labor Management Act"'
only amends the Wagner Act." Thus the possibility remains that
the statutory provision does not dispose of all the doctrines de-
59 Electric Steel Foundry, 74 N. L. R. B. 30 (1947).
60 United Welding Co., 72 N. L. R. B. 165 (1947 (non-coercive letters devoid of an
anti-union background).
61 Fisher.Governor Co., 71 N. L R. B. 1291 (1947) ; LaSalle Steel Co., 72 N. L R. B-
78 (1947).
82 Ibid.
8 29 U. S. C. A. § 141 et seq. (Supp. 1947).
64 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. § 151 et seq. (1942).
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veloped under the Wagner Act. On the other hand, Congress must
be assumed to have spoken purposefully and that some change in
existing law was effected. But what Congress intended to do, and
what, in the eyes of the courts, Congress succeeded in doing, may
be separate questions.
In weighing the probable impact of Section 8 (c) upon existing
law, it would be premature to look upon that provision as recep-
tive to none but a literal construction. Nor can it be said, at the
outset, that the section is so phrased that it instantly admits to an
ambiguous construction. An intermediate approach is open, since
the provision is so fashioned that reasonable minds could differ
as to the presence or absence of ambiguous language therein.
Section 8 (c), in a summary fashion, forbids the use of em-
ployer expressions so as to constitute or be evidence of an unfair
labor practice if such expressions contain no threat of reprisal or
force or promise of benefit. A literal interpretation would pro-
ceed upon the theory that employer expressions, as a class, are
to be privileged and that all illegal expressions are confined to a
very restricted category. It is then an easy matter to arrive at the
conclusion that the fear or hope-inducing elements must be dis-
covered, if at all, within the bare confines of the expression in
question. On the other hand, it may truthfully be said that the
character of every act, verbal or otherwise, depends upon the
circumstances surrounding it. An expression may "contain," in a
very practical sense, a threat or a promise though proof of the
existence of this quality can only be made by use of collateral
evidence. Thus, an ambiguity is discoverable by virtue of the use
of the word "contain" in Section 8 (c). The important question
is, what are the factors which will predispose a court to fasten
upon it? Although most human utterances are ambiguous, a statute
is not so considered until a court finds such to be true.
As previously stated, the Labor Management Act only amends
the Wagner Act. Under the Wagner Act, it was an established
practice to find that an employer expression contained an element
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
of coercion when the expression was viewed in the light of other
activities. In enacting amendatory legislation, the legislature is
presumed to have been aware of the judicial interpretation placed
upon the amended statute and to have precluded this interpreta-
tion from attaching to the amending statute only in so far as it
does so expressly or by necessary implication."
Twelve years of litigation upon the question of the permissible
bounds of employer free speech under the Wagner Act produced
a number of highly adaptable formulas which the courts will be
loath to abandon. The law abounds with illustrations of the ability
of the judiciary to preserve a useful legal tool from legislative
annihilation by use of a "nice distinction."
Section 8 (c) of the Labor Management Act, by its terms, as-
sumes that some employer expressions will attain the status of un-
fair labor practices. To be sure, the expressions of the employer
are to be sifted and subjected to a rigid qualitative analysis, but
the fact remains that some may pass the test. This being true, the
courts will again be called upon to weigh the effect of an expres-
sion upon the mental process of a listener, or group of listeners.
To require that the threat or promise be "contained" in the sen-
tence, paragraph, letter, pamphlet or address, as the case may be,
will in no way relieve them of the difficulties inherent to this
decision. The state of a man's mind will again be the object of
judicial inquiry, and again the enjoyment of a constitutional privi-
lege is to depend upon the varied understandings and emotional
susceptibilities of the complainant. This was the basic problem
which confronted the courts in the employer free speech cases
under the Wagner Act. There the solutions were forged to fit the
case and admit to no criticism without an exhaustive analysis of the
particular fact situation involved. The problem being of such com-
plexity, a statutory intrusion therein is apt to be deemed in-
adequate, and a construction of that statute which permits the
most flexible approach may well be favored.
65 United States v. Dakota.Montana Oil Co., 288 U. S. 459 (1933).
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The Labor Management Act intends to promote industrial peace
through the encouragement of collective bargaining and protection
of employee rights." In short, the employee continues to occupy a
favored position. A widely accepted principle of statutory con-
struction requires a statute to be construed as a whole,"7 and if the
whole context of the statute indicates a particular object of the
legislature, certain implications consonant with that controlling
intent may be imported into the section under consideration." A
general purpose must control the interpretation put upon the par-
ticular section. Therefore the question of whether or not the courts
will be content to accept a bare literal construction of Section 8
(c) largely depends on their conception of how well such con-
struction will serve the controlling purposes of the statute. If
judicial experience and common understanding indicate a lack of
practical utility, then an ambiguity may conveniently appear.
Under the Wagner Act, all restrictions placed on the employer's
right to free speech were the results of judicial interpretation.
Consequently the courts were free to fashion their own tools. An
expression which could clearly be found to be coercive by virtue
of its own composition was not often encountered. These could be
relegated to an illegal category with ease. When the expression,
from all surface indications, was devoid of illegality, the accepted
practice permitted reference to other events in order to give mean-
ing to the utterance. That this method often led to absurd results
is not now relevant. The important thing is that the courts have
recognized that an effective and accurate inquiry into the con.
sequences of the act of uttering words will nearly always involve
a consideration of the circumstances surrounding the act. A
6629 U. S. C. A. § 151 (Supp. 1947). "it is declared to be the policy of the
United States to eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow
of commerce.., by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and
by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self organization,
and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating
the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection."
6T Helvering v. New York Trust Co., 292 U. S. 455 (1934).
6s Durousseau v. United States, 101 U. S. 307 (1810).
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construction of Section 8 (c) which requires that the illegality
of the expression be taken from the words alone may not take care
of the problem of actually protecting the employee. As one
learned judge remarked:
"Words are not pebbles in alien juxtaposition; they have only a
communal existence; and not only does the meaning of each inter-
penetrate the other, but all in their aggregate take their purport from
the setting in which they are used...
Taking this to be an eloquent expression of what lesser men
simply refer to as "common knowledge," the result may be that
any interpretation of Section 8 (c) which attempts to divorce
words from their natural setting will not be lightly regarded. At
this point, a court may be disposed to note with satisfaction that
Section 8 (c) as such, does not preclude a finding that implied
threats or promises may become the basis for any employer unfair
labor practice.
A decision to the effect that a given expression, standing alone,
is coercive, is a conclusion of law. Conclusions of law were sub-
ject to judicial review under the Wagner Act."0 On the other hand,
the power to review findings of fact was not considered by the
courts to be within their province. 1 In this, the Labor Manage-
ment Act purports to change the law, for now the courts have
increased power to review findings of facts as made by the Board.'
Thus, a literal interpretation of Section 8 (c) would provide the
courts with no occasion to exercise these new powers. If, however,
that provision may be looked upon as admitting to an interpre-
tation which presupposes the evaluation of factors other than the
expression alone, then the increased power of the court to review
the findings of fact as made bv the Board is appropriate to the
89 N. L. R. B. v. Federbush Co., 121 F. (2d) 954, 957 (C. C. A. 2d 1941).
10 Consolidated Edison Co. v. N. L. R. B., 305 U. S. 197, 229 (1938).
11 Ibid.
7., 29 U. S. C. A. § 160(c) (Supp. 1947). The conference committee, in discussing this
feature of the act were of the opinion that the courts had "abdicated" to the Board.
I C. C. H. LAE. LAw SEv., 1 8350 (1947).
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problem of determining the coercive effect of an employer
expression.
Laying aside a consideration of the factors which may dispose
a court to find ambiguous terminology in Section 8 (c), evidence
to support a literal interpretation is available.
The National Labor Relations Act indicated by its title that
it was a statute designed to further the collective efforts of the
industrial employee. The amending statute, by virtue of the pres-
ence of the word "management" in its title, evidences an intention
to deal with the employers in a more favorable way.
It is significant that the fundamental right of employees to en-
gage in concerted activities is, by the Labor Management Act, to
be protected by "restoring equality of bargaining power between
employers and employees."" An impression that reciprocal rights
are to be created is inescapable. If equality in bargaining power
is to be restored, one of the industrial adversaries must now oc-
cupy an unfairly weak position. It may well be the employer, for
Congress made no finding in the Labor Management Act, as was
made in the Wagner Act, that the employer occupies a position
of ascendancy."
The Wagner Act attributed industrial unrest to the refusal of
employers to bargain collectively with employees." The Labor
Management Act attributes this condition to the refusal of some
employers to bargain collectively,"' thus implying that employers,
as a group, no longer refuse to recognize the rights of the em-
ployees. Moreover, labor unions are now found to be responsible
for a measure of industrial strife."
Certain features of Section 2, the definition section of the Labor
Management Act, continue to develop the theme of limited em-
ployer liability. As defined therein, an employer is one who acts
T3 29 U. S. C. A. § 141 et seq. (Supp. 1947).
74 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. § 151 (1942).
7" Ibid.




in that capacity, and also a person "acting as an agent of the
employer.""5 The National Labor Relations Act defined an em-
ployer so as to include any person "acting in the interest of an
employer.""8 The obvious intent of this change is to narrow the
employer's liability for the remarks of his supervisory employees
to cases covered by ordinary rules of agency law."0
The statute contains other provisions implying a decided change
in the position to be occupied by the employer; it narrows the
liability of employers for discharges under union security agree-
ments;" it provides that employers are under no duty to recognize
supervisors' unions; 2 it gives employers the right to petition for
investigations of representation;" it gives the employers the right
to sue unions for damages in certain cases;" it permits employers
to file charges of unfair labor practices against unions. Last, but
most important, is the fact that the mere presence of Section 8 (c)
is evidence of a congressional intent to alter the previous concept
of the employer's liability for his choice of words while treating
with his employees.
Thus far, an attempt has been made to identify a number of
influences that might logically be expected to condition the courts
to one of two approaches to the problem of applying Section 8 (c).
78Id. 1152 (3).
79 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. § 152 (3) (1942).
80 "The bill, by defining as an 'employer' 'any person acting as an agent of an
employer' makes employers responsible for what people say or do only when it is within
the actmal or apparent scope of thir authority, and thereby makes the ordinary rules of
the law of agency equally applicable to (mployers and to unions." 1 C. C. H. LAB. LAW
SErv. 8018 (1947).
5129 U. S. C. A. 158(a) (3) (Supp. 1947). Section (14b) expressly provides that it
does not authorize the execution of any union-security agreements in any state or territory
in which such agreements are prohibited by State or Territorial law. Apparently this will
do much to settle the question of the constitutionality, from a federal point of view, of
the various anti-closed shop statutes or constitutional amendments enacted by several
states.
82 Id. § 152 (3). The act expressly provides, in Section 164, that organizational activi-
ties on the part of supervisors are not made unlawful.
83 Id. § 159 (c) (1) (B), and § 159 (c) (2) requires the Board to apply the same rules
regardless of the identity of the person filing the petition.
84 Id. 1 185. See also § 187(b) relating to right of employers to sue for damages re-
suting from boycotts and illegal strikes.
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On the one hand, the very nature of the problem of measuring
the effect of a mere choice of words, and the practical solution
thereof, probably requires that some extra meaning be read into
that section. Congress, however, may not have intended to leave
co the courts the matter of choosing the most practical solution.
On the other hand, considerable evidence is available to support
an inference to the effect that Congress has said that the coercive
elements of an employer expression must be discovered somewhere
between its first and last syllables. The trouble with this view is
that if such was the intent of the legislators, they could easily
have found words to that precise effect. In short, the ambiguity
in Section 8 (c) arises, not from the words used, but from a lack
of sufficient words. Congress has commanded the courts to protect
the employee and at the same time save the employer from the
consequences of his acts. Precisely how this should be done is not
revealed; therefore a reference to legislative history is justified.
Both the House bill" and the Senate amendment"6 contained
provisions designed to protect the right of employers to free
speech. The Senate amendment sought to moderate the somewhat
extreme position taken by the House, and the final result was em-




An analysis of these various adjustments will do much to clarify
Section 8 (c).
The House Report complained of the manner in which the
Board would "infer from what the employer said, perhaps long
before," that a present act constituted an unfair labor practice."
In legal parlance, this would amount to no more than a general
objection to the quality of the evidence upon which a finding was
based. For example, the evidence was irrelevant, lacked proba-
tive value, or was without connection with the fact in issue. But
the House did not intend to base its statute on legal refinements,





for, in the words of its committee, the bill sought to provide that
nothing anyone says shall constitute or be evidence of an
unfair labor practice unless it, by its own express terms, threatens
force or economic reprisal. This means that a statement may not be
used against a person making it unless it standing alone is un-
fair .. s (Italics supplied.)
The views of the Senate Committee were not of this positive
nature. As did the House Committee, that body complained of the
practice of the Board in finding a speech of an employer to be
coercive by referring to "severable and unrelated" unfair labor
practices.9" The Senate, however, only meant to provide that
"... if, under all the circumstances, there is neither an express or
implied threat of reprisal, force, or offer of benefit, the Board shall
not predicate any finding of unfair labor practice upon the state-
ment." 9' (Italics supplied.)
The Senate Committee went on to state that "the Board, of
course, will not be precluded from considering such statements
as evidence.''9 - (Italics supplied.)
The foregoing reference to the committee reports of the several
legislative bodies indicates the precise result each sought to bring
about. The House bill sought to confine the search for coercive
elements to the very expression in question. The Senate amend-
ment, on the contrary, condoned the use of evidence other than
the expression under surveillance. It should be noted that the
Senate had desired that some logical connection be preserved be-
tween the expression and the circumstances alleged to impart a
coercive color to that expression. Then if the original House bill,
and the Senate amendment thereto, are carefully compared with
Section 8 (c), with a view of discovering how much of the House
and how much of the Senate view survived, it is logical to expect
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The House bill took this form:
"Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, the following
shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under
any of the provisions of this Act:
(1) Expressing any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemina-
tion thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form ii it
does not by its own terms threaten force or economic reprisal." s
(Italics supplied.)
As far as is relevant to this discussion, the Senate amendment
provided:
"The Board shall not base any finding of unfair labor practice
upon any statement of views or arguments, either written or oral, if
such statement contains under all the circumstances no threat, express
or implied, of reprisal or force, or offer of benefit . ." (Italics
supplied.)
Section 8 (c), which represents the compromise between these
views, adopted the provisions of the House bill with one very sig-
nificant change: it does not specifically require that an expression
by its own terms, threaten force or reprisal before it can become
an unfair labor practice. Impliedly, at least, it is recognized that
apparently innocuous expressions may have this very effect. This
is the first step toward the view that Congress realized that words
cannot be divorced from their natural setting with practical results.
The Conference Report stated that the House bill was to be
adopted with one change as derived from the Senate amendment."'
Thus it appears that the only change in the House bill was to
embody the views of the Senate on this precise matter. The missing
feature of the House bill was that portion which referred to the
manner of proving the coercive character of an expression. Since
the Senate amendment must supply this, and since that amendment
would permit reference to "all the circumstances," there is em-
93 H. t. REP. No. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
LAw REP. 26 (April 24, 1947).
94 SEN. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
5 1 C. C. H. LAB. LAw SFav. 9 8180 (1947).
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bodied in the final provision all implied congressional approval
of the Senate view. In other words, when Section 8 (c) requires
that the element of coercion must be "contained" in the expression
under attack, it means that a reference to the circumstances sur-
rounding the expression is not forbidden.
The question of how far afield the investigator may go to find
facts to color the expression is not to be settled in this manner. As
did the House report and the Senate report, the conference report
was concerned with the practice of the Board in drawing coercive
implications from apparently disconnected events. Some signifi-
cance may be attached to the fact that the conference committee
referred to this as the practice of using "irrelevant and imrate-
rial" evidence." Connecting this statement to the portion of the
statute which apparently increases the courts' power to review
finding of fact as made by the Board,"7 it is not illogical to con-
clude that Congress intended that the courts were free to apply
ordinary legal standards in determining the evidentiary value of
these auxiliary facts. The Board, as a matter of course, would he
forced to comply with the same standards, since an order of the
Board has no force until the pov.er of an appropriate court is
invoked." A little weight is added to this view by virtue of the
fact that Section 10 (b) provides that Board hearings
shall, as far as practicable, be conducted in accordance with
the rules of evidence applicable in the district courts of the United
States under the rules of procedure for such courts. adopted by the
Supreme Court of the United States ..."
The Wagner Act had provided that in Board proceedings "the
rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity shall not
be controlling. ' "' Perhaps the courts will now be required to ap-
praise, in order to reject, those "imponderable subtleties" which
96 Ibid.
97 29 U. S. C. A. § 160(e) (Supp. 1947'.
981d. § 160(e) and 160(f).
99 Id. § 160(b).
100 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A.§ 151 (1942).
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the Supreme Court refused to consider in the Virginia Electric &
Power Co. case. 10' At any rate, Section 8 (c) in light of the com-
mittee reports, appears to be no more than a rule of evidence.
By adopting a view that Congress contemplated a procedure
whereby the courts are free to look beyond the bare confines of
an employer expression to discover its coercive character, the
practical problem of protecting the employee can be answered.
Precisely how far the courts will go in using evidence other than
the expression itself is open to doubt. At the moment, the follow.
ing rule may present a fairly safe guide:
The coercive character of an employer expression may be found
(1) from the tenor and unmistakable import of the words of the
expression itself, or (2) by reference to the circumstances immediate-
ly surrounding the expression when made, or (3) by reference to
facts and circumstances which, though not coincidental in point of
time to the expression, bear such a relationship to it that no reason-
able mind could fail to perceive that the expression, in light of those
circumstances, had the net operative effect of coercing an employee
or group of employees.
It is not improbable that the courts will be prepared to adopt
a highly flexible interpretation of Section 8 (c); one that is ca-
pable of affording protection to both of the industrial adversaries.
It is a mistake to assume that the interests of the employer and
employee are irreconcilable. For this reason, it would be unrea-
sonable to advocate an interpretation of Section 8 (c) which would
give either one of the industrial combatants a marked advantage.
The bar of justice is the proper place to seek a compromise, and
there is no reason to suppose that none can be found.
-Richard H. Munsterman.
1(, 314 U. S. 469, 479 (1941).
